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Abstract. In the computational social choice literature, there has been great interest in
understanding how computational complexity can act as a barrier against manipulation
of elections. Much of this literature, however, makes the assumption that the voters or
agents specify a complete preference ordering over the set of candidates. There are many
multiagent systems applications, and even real-world elections, where this assumption is not
warranted, and this in turn raises the question “How hard is it to manipulate elections if the
agents reveal only partial preference orderings?”. It is this question we try to address in this
paper. In particular, we look at the weighted manipulation problem – both constructive and
destructive manipulation – when the voters are allowed to specify any top-truncated ordering
over the set of candidates. We provide general results for all scoring rules, for elimination
versions of all scoring rules, for the plurality with runoff rule, for a family of election systems
known as Copelandα, and for the maximin protocol. Finally, we also look at the impact on
complexity of manipulation when there is uncertainty about the non-manipulators’ votes.
1 Introduction
Preference aggregation is an important problem in multiagent settings as there are many
scenarios where a group of agents has to make a common decision. The process of arriving
at this decision, in turn, has to accommodate the needs and preferences of all the partici-
pating agents. A natural, and commonly used, mechanism to achieve this is voting, where
all the agents specify their preferences and a previously agreed-upon procedure – called
the election system or voting protocol – is used to arrive at the decision. Although voting
is a useful and widely used mechanism, it is not without its problems. One particular issue
that arises is manipulation or strategic voting by the agents who, by misreporting their
true preferences, may attempt to sway the outcome of the election in their favor. Although
every reasonable voting system is known to be manipulable by the Gibbard-Satterthwaite
theorem, a goal of a recent body of literature – which started with Bartholdi et. al’s pa-
per [1] – has been to understand if and when computational complexity can be used as a
barrier against strategic voting (see [6], [8] for surveys).
A common assumption in much of the research in computational social choice is that
the agents fully specify their preferences by providing a complete preference ordering over
all the candidates or alternatives. However, there are many practical situations where
the agents may not be able to determine a complete ranking over all the candidates or
even if they can specify a complete ranking, the voting rule used may not insist that
one be provided. Thus, it is important to understand the repercussions of having “partial
votes” in general. While a “partial vote” can refer to any partial ordering over the set of
candidates, in this paper we focus on one kind of “partial vote” namely, top-truncated
votes. Top-truncated votes are natural in many settings where an agent is certain about
its most preferred candidates but is indifferent among the remaining ones or is unsure
about them.
There has been some work that has looked at election problems when preferences are
only partially specified. Among them, the work by Konczak and Lang introduced the
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possible and necessary winners problem [12], and Xia and Conitzer extended this further
to study the possible and necessary winners problem for many different voting rules when
the number of candidates are unbounded and the elections unweighted [17]. Additionally,
Lu and Boutilier have looked at the multi-winner problem when only partial preferences
are provided [13]. There are two other papers that are closely related to our work. First
is the work by Baumeister et al. which discusses planning various kinds of campaigns
in settings where the ballots can be truncated at the top, bottom or both [2]. In this
work they introduced the extension-bribery problem, a special case of which is closely
related to the manipulation problem with top-truncated ballots that we consider here.
The second related work and the one which is the main motivation behind our work is
that of Narodytska andWalsh where they provide an analysis of constructive manipulation
(for both weighted and unweighted voters) for three particular voting protocols: Borda,
STV, and the Copeland rule [14]. In addition to the above mentioned works, we are also
aware of a very recent paper1 by Fitzsimmons and Hemaspaandra which looks into how
the complexity of bribery, control, and manipulation is affected when ties are allowed [9].
We note that except for one theorem (Theorem 10), none of our other results overlap
with theirs as all their results are derived using only one the following protocols: Borda,
plurality, t-approval, and Copelandα.
In this paper, we look at broader classes of voting rules and we study both constructive
and destructive manipulation in weighted elections. In doing so, we provide general results
for the complexity of manipulation for all scoring rules, for elimination versions of all
scoring rules, for the plurality with runoff rule, for a family of election systems known as
Copelandα, and for the maximin protocol. Additionally, we also look at the impact on
complexity of manipulation with top-truncated ballots when there is uncertainty about
the non-manipulators’ votes, and, to the best of our knowledge, are the first to study the
same. Because of space constraints, many of our proofs have been moved to the appendix.
2 Preliminaries
We model an election as a pair E = (C, V ), where C = {c1, · · · , cm} is the set of candidates
and V = {v1, · · · , vn} is the set of voters. Each voter vi has a preference order Oi on C. Oi
is said to be a complete order (or a complete vote) when it is antisymmetric, transitive,
and a total ordering on C. In this paper we also consider top-truncated orders (or simply
top orders), meaning that Oi can be a linear order over any non-empty subset of C and
where all the unranked candidates are tied and are assumed to be ranked below the ranked
candidates. For example, consider an election scenario with C = {c1, c2, c3}. A voter vi
who prefers c2 the best and dislikes c1 the most has a complete ordering Oi which is
represented by (c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c1) or sometimes simply (c2, c3, c1), while another voter vj who
likes c3 but has no opinion on c1 and c2 has a top-truncated ordering Oj given by (c3). A
preference profile is a vector P = 〈O1, · · · , On〉 of individual preferences. Since this paper
considers weighted manipulation, additionally every voter vi has a non-negative integer
weight wi associated with them.
2.1 Voting Protocols
A voting protocol is a function defined from the set of all preference profiles to the set of
winners, where the winner set can be any subset over the set of candidates C. The following
are the commonly-studied voting rules that we consider in this paper. For each of them,
1 This paper was obtained through personal communication.
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we first define them on complete orderings and then talk about how the evaluations are
done when there are top orders.
1. Positional scoring rules: A positional scoring rule is defined by a scoring vector
α = 〈α1, · · · , αm〉, where α1 ≥ · · · ≥ αm. For each voter v, a candidate receives αi
points if it is ranked in the ith position by v. In a scoring rule, the candidate with
highest total score si is the winner. Some examples of scoring rules are the plurality
rule with α = 〈1, 0, · · · , 0〉, the Borda rule with α = 〈m − 1,m − 2, · · · , 0〉, and the
veto rule with α = 〈1, · · · , 1, 0〉.
To deal with top-truncated ballots where a voter ranks only k out of the m candidates
(k < m), we consider the following three schemes that were used by Narodytska and
Walsh in their preliminary work on manipulation with top-truncated preferences [14]
(see [5] to see how the following schemes fare for the Borda rule). As we will show in
the results, the choice of evaluation scheme does have an impact on the hardness of
manipulation.
(a) Round up: A candidate ranked in the ith position (i ≤ k) receives a score of αi,
while all the unranked candidates receive a score of αm. For example, consider an
election with C = {c1, c2, c3, c4}. Let a voter v give a preference ordering (c3, c1).
In this case, c3 receives a score of α1, c1 receives a score of α2, and both c2 and c4
receive α4. For any positional scoring rule X, we denote this by X↑.
(b) Round down: A candidate ranked in the ith position (i ≤ k) receives a score
of αm−(k−i)−1, while all the unranked candidates receive a score of αm. For the
example above, in this case c3 receives a score of α2, c1 receives a score of α3, and
both c2 and c4 receive a score of α4. For any positional scoring rule X, we denote
this by X↓.
(c) Average score: A candidate ranked in the ith position (i ≤ k) receives a score
of αi, while all the unranked candidates receive a score of
∑
k<j≤m αj
m−k . For the
example above, in this case c3 receives a score of α1, c1 receives a score of α2,
and both c2 and c4 receive a score of
α3+α4
2 . For any positional scoring rule X, we
denote this by Xav.
2. Scoring elimination rules: Let X be any scoring rule. Given a complete order-
ing, eliminate(X) is the rule that successively eliminates the candidate placed in the
last place by X. Once a candidate is eliminated, the rule is then repeated with the
reduced set of candidates until there is a single candidate left. Some examples of
scoring elimination rules are the Single Transferable Vote (STV) which is basically
eliminate(plurality) and the Baldwin’s rule which is eliminate(Borda).
In scoring elimination rules, we deal with top-truncated votes by using a method given
by Narodytska and Walsh which is analogous to rounding up for scoring rules [14].
Here, we consider a vote to be valid only until at least one of the candidates listed in
it is remaining in the election. In other words, we simply ignore a vote once all the
candidates listed in it are eliminated.
3. Plurality with runoff: The plurality with runoff rule proceeds in two steps. In the
first step, all the candidates except the top two with the most number of first votes
are eliminated. This is followed by a transfer of votes to the second round where the
winner is determined using the majority rule.
Top-truncated votes here are dealt in the same way as they are done for scoring
elimination rules.
4. Copelandα: Faliszewski et al. [7] introduced a family of election systems known as
Copelandα by introducing a parameter α (α ∈ Q, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1) that essentially describes
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the value of a tie. In Copelandα, for each pair of candidates, the candidate preferred
by the majority receives one point and the other one receives a 0. In case of a tie, both
receive α points. The winner in a Copelandα election is one with the highest score.
Usually when papers use the Copeland rule they essentially mean Copeland0.5 which
was the original rule proposed by Copeland.
For Copelandα, and the maximin rule below, we can deal with top-truncated votes by
just sticking to the definition which assumes that all the unranked candidates are tied
and are ranked below the ranked candidates.
5. Maximin: Let NP (ci, cj) denote the number of voters who prefer ci over cj in the
preference profile P . Then the maximin score of ci is si = minj 6=iNP (ci, cj). The
winner in the maximin rule is the one with the highest score.
2.2 Manipulation
In this paper, we consider two kinds of manipulation: constructive manipulation and
destructive manipulation. Broadly, the goal in the former is to make a preferred candidate
win, while in the latter it is to ensure that a certain disliked candidate does not win.
More formally, we consider constructive weighted coalitional manipulation and destructive
weighted coalitional manipulation which was first studied by Contizer et al. [4] and are
described below.
Definition 1 (CWCM). In Constructive Weighted Coalitional Manipulation (CWCM),
given a set of weighted votes S (votes of the non-manipulators), the weights for a set of
votes T (manipulators’ votes), and a preferred candidate p, we are asked if there exists a
way to cast the votes in T so that p wins the election.
In this paper, unless otherwise specified, all the results are based on the non-unique
winner model (where the objective is to make p a winner) which we use as our standard
model.
Definition 2 (DWCM). In Destructive Weighted Coalitional Manipulation (DWCM),
given a set of weighted votes S (votes of the non-manipulators), the weights for a set of
votes T (manipulators’ votes), and a disliked candidate h, we are asked if there exists a
way to cast the votes in T so that h does not win the election.
2.3 Computational Complexity
In most of the proofs for NP-hardness in this paper, we use reductions from either the
well-known NP-complete problem Partition or from a variant of the subset sum problem
which we call Fixed-Difference Subset Sum.
Definition 3 (Partition). Given a set of non-negative integers S = {ki}1≤i≤t summing
to 2K, we are asked if there exists a subset S1 of S which sums to K.
Definition 4 (Fixed-Difference Subset Sum). Given a set of non-negative integers
S = {ki}1≤i≤t summing to 2K, we are asked if there exists two disjoint subsets S1, S2 of
S such that
∑
S1−
∑
S2 = K, where
∑
Si denotes the sum of all the elements in the set
Si.
The NP-completeness of Fixed-Difference Subset Sum can be shown by a reduction from
Partition.
Theorem 1. Fixed-Difference Subset Sum is NP-complete.
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3 Constructive Manipulation
In this section we look at the complexity of constructive manipulation when top-truncated
ballots are allowed. We begin by looking at scoring rules and we completely characterize
the complexity of manipulation for all 3-candidate scoring rules when using each of the
evaluation schemes defined before. Note that in the complete votes case, all scoring rules
except plurality are known to be NP-complete for m ≥ 3 candidates [4,11].
3.1 Scoring Rules
Theorem 2. For any positional scoring rule X, computing if a coalition of manipula-
tors can manipulate X↑ with weighted top-truncated votes takes polynomial time (for any
number of candidates).
Proof. The manipulators can simply check if all of them voting for p alone will make it a
winner. If not, they cannot make p a winner. ⊓⊔
Theorem 3. For the plurality and veto protocol, computing if a coalition of manipulators
can manipulate plurality↓ or veto↓ with weighted top-truncated votes takes polynomial time
(for any number of candidates).
Proof. For the veto protocol, the manipulators can simply check if all of them voting for
p alone will make it a winner. If not, they cannot make p a winner.
In case of plurality, they can check if all of them placing p at the top and all the other
candidates in arbitrary order can make p a winner. ⊓⊔
Theorem 4. For any 3-candidate positional scoring protocol X that is not isomorphic to
plurality or veto, CWCM with top-truncated votes in X↓ is NP-complete.
Theorem 5. Computing if a coalition of manipulators can manipulate plurality av with
weighted top-truncated votes takes polynomial time (for any number of candidates).
Proof. The manipulators can simply check if all of them voting for p alone will make it a
winner. If not, they cannot make p a winner. ⊓⊔
Theorem 6. For any 3-candidate positional scoring protocol X that is not isomorphic to
plurality, CWCM with top-truncated votes in Xav is NP-complete.
Although both Theorem 4 and Theorem 6 can be proved by constructing much simpler
instances (by using the fact that even the non-manipulators can cast top-truncated votes),
the reason we use these instances will be clear in Section 5 when we look at the impact
on manipulation when there is uncertainty about the non-manipulators’ votes.
3.2 Scoring Elimination Rules
We now consider scoring elimination rules and first look at how top-truncated voting af-
fects the complexity of manipulation in eliminate(veto). Following that we prove a general
result for all scoring elimination rules.
Theorem 7. For eliminate(veto), in the unique winner model, any manipulation that
can be achieved by casting top-truncated votes can be achieved if only complete votes were
allowed.
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Since top-truncated voting does not encourage more strategic voting, it follows that for
bounded number of candidates we can use the result by Coleman and Teague who showed
that CWCM for eliminate(veto) can is in P when the votes are completely specified [3].
Corollary 1. In the unique winner model, computing if a coalition of manipulators can
manipulate eliminate(veto) with weighted top-truncated votes takes polynomial time for
bounded number of candidates.
We note that in the non-unique winner model, CWCM for 3-candidate eliminate(veto)
can be shown to be NP-complete in both the complete and top-truncated voting scenarios.
Next, we consider elimination versions of scoring rules in general and show that CWCM
with top-truncated votes for m ≥ 3 candidates is NP-complete for elimination version of
any scoring rule that is not isomorphic to veto. For this, we first show that top-truncated
voting does not change the complexity of Anti-WCM for any scoring rule. Subsequently,
we use this result and an identical reduction as in [3] to prove our main result.
Definition 5 (Anti-WCM). Given a set S of weighted votes, the weights for a set of
votes T , and a disliked candidate d, we are asked if there exists a way to cast the votes in
T so that it results in d receiving the lowest score.
Theorem 8. Top-truncated voting does not change the worst-case complexity of Anti-
WCM for any scoring protocol.
As a result of the above theorem, we have the following corollary which says that
for any scoring rule not isomorphic to veto, Anti-WCM with top-truncated votes is NP-
complete. Note that the corollary here is based on the result of Coleman and Teague who
proved that Anti-WCM is NP-complete for all scoring rules not isomorphic to veto [3].
Corollary 2. For any scoring rule with α = 〈α1, · · · , αm〉, Anti-WCM with top-truncated
votes is in P if α1 = · · · = αm−1 and is NP-complete otherwise.
Theorem 9. For any scoring rule X that is not isomorphic to veto, CWCM with top-
truncated votes in eliminate(X) is NP-complete.
Proof. From Corollary 2 we know that Anti-WCM with top-truncated votes is NP-
complete for any scoring rule that is not isomorphic to veto. Therefore we can use the
exact same technique as in [3, Theorem 13] where they use a reduction from an arbitrary
instance of Anti-WCM to prove the above result for the case of complete votes. ⊓⊔
Since the plurality with runoff rule is the same as STV when there are only three
candidates, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 3. For the 3-candidate plurality with runoff rule, CWCM with top-truncated
votes is NP-complete.
3.3 Copelandα
Narodytska and Walsh showed that CWCM with top-truncated votes in the Copeland
rule (Copeland0.5) is NP-complete for four candidates [14]. Additionally, they also conjec-
tured that the result holds when the number of candidates is three. Here we prove that
conjecture, and also show that our hardness result holds for all rational α ∈ [0, 1). We
note that the following result has also been independently obtained by Fitzsimmons and
Hemaspaandra in a very recent paper (obtained through personal communication) [9].
Theorem 10. Let α be a rational number with 0 ≤ α < 1. For Copelandα, CWCM with
top-truncated votes is NP-complete for three candidates.
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3.4 Maximin
Although we have seen instances like in scoring rules with the round-up evaluation scheme
(Theorem 2) were top-truncated voting decreases the complexity of manipulation (as com-
pared to the complete votes case), they aren’t really conclusive in the sense that one could
question the choice of the evaluation scheme that in turn caused the result. Clearly, the
round-up evaluation scheme isn’t a good choice as what we’re essentially doing by em-
ploying the same is to encourage the manipulators to treat it just as a plurality-type
rule. Therefore, one question that could arise is: “Is there a voting system for which no
matter how the top-truncated votes are dealt with the complexity of manipulation with
top-truncated ballots decreases?”. We answer this question below in the affirmative. We
see that as long as all the unranked candidates are considered tied and are assumed to be
ranked below the ranked candidates (which is the natural definition of a top-truncated
vote), the complexity of manipulation with top-truncated ballots is in P for the max-
imin rule. Note that CWCM for the maximin rule is known to be NP-complete for four
candidates when we consider only complete votes [4, Theorem 8]2.
Theorem 11. Computing if a coalition of manipulators can manipulate the maximin
protocol with weighted top-truncated votes takes polynomial time (for any number of can-
didates).
To prove this, we show that any constructive manipulation achieved for p can be achieved
if all manipulators just vote (p). The detailed proof can be found in the appendix.
4 Destructive Manipulation
In this section we look at the complexity of destructive manipulation when top-truncated
ballots are allowed. We begin by looking at a broad class of rules for which top-truncated
voting has no impact on strategic voting. This class consists of all voting rules where the
candidates are assigned numerical scores based on the votes and are monotone, meaning
that if a voter vi changes his or her vote (from ≻ to ≻
′) in such a way that {b : a ≻ b} ⊆
{b : a ≻′ b}, then a’s score will not decrease (or informally, more support for a candidate
will not decrease it’s score). Note that although elimination versions of scoring rules like
STV and the Baldwin’s rule are based on numerical scores, they are not monotone and
hence aren’t part of the class of voting rules we consider in the theorem below.
Theorem 12. For any voting rule that is monotone and is based on numerical scores,
any destructive manipulation that can be achieved by casting top-truncated votes can be
achieved if only complete votes were allowed.
Since top-truncated voting has no impact on destructive manipulation in rules that
are monotone and are based on numerical scores, it follows that for bounded number of
candidates we can use the result by Conitzer et al. who showed that DWCM was in P for
all of them when only complete votes are allowed [4].
Corollary 4. DWCM with top-truncated votes is in P for all scoring rules, for the max-
imin rule, and for Copelandα.
2 Although Conitzer et al. uses the unique winner model [4], it can be verified that the result holds for
non-unique winner model as well.
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Next, we consider the elimination versions of all 3-candidate scoring rules and we
show how for all scoring rules that are not isomorphic to veto DWCM is NP-complete.
We prove this by using a reduction from an arbitrary instance of Anti-WCM.
Theorem 13. For any 3-candidate positional scoring rule X that is not isomorphic to
veto, DWCM in eliminate(X) with top-truncated votes is NP-complete.
Again, since the plurality with runoff rule is equivalent to STV when there are only
three candidates, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 5. For the 3-candidate plurality with runoff rule, DWCM with top-truncated
votes is NP-complete.
5 Impact on Complexity of Manipulation when there is Uncertainty
about the Non-manipulators’ Votes
So far, we have looked at the complexity of manipulation with top-truncated ballots when
the manipulators have complete information on the non-manipulators’ votes. Although a
useful setting to study given that it enables us to look at the hardness of manipulation
without having to worry about the complexities that are introduced as part of the un-
certainty model, the assumption that the manipulators will have complete information
isn’t always realistic. Therefore, we now look at how incomplete information about the
non-manipulators impact the complexity of manipulation with top-truncated ballots. To
the best of our knowledge, we are the first to look at complexity of manipulation with
top-truncated ballots when there is uncertainty about the others’ votes.
To model the incomplete information setting, we consider the following two scenarios
and we study each of them separately. Note that the second setting has been studied by
Conitzer et al. for the case of complete votes [4].
1. What if only top-truncated preference orderings of the non-manipulators were visible
to the manipulators?
2. What if the manipulators have only probabilistic information on the votes of the
non-manipulators?
5.1 When only top orders of the non-manipulators are visible
Before we look at the problem of manipulation, let us introduce two other problems: i) the
problem of evaluating a candidate’s winning probability when there’s uncertainty about
the votes and ii) the weighted version of the extension-bribery problem which in turn was
introduced by Baumeister et al. [2]. As has been the case throughout this paper, we only
consider elections in which the voters are weighted.
Definition 6 (Evaluation under Top-truncated Uncertainty). We are given a set
S which is a partially-revealed top-truncated set of votes of a certain set S′ (which in
turn may contain complete or top-truncated ballots themselves), the weights of each of the
voters, a candidate p, and a number r ∈ [0, 1]. We are asked if the probability of p winning
in the original election (where S′ is the set of votes cast) is greater than r.
Definition 7 (Weighted Extension-bribery).We are given a set S of votes which are
possibly top-truncated, the weights of each of the voters in V , a collection ∆ = (δ1, · · · , δn)
of extension-bribery cost functions, a preferred candidate p, and a budget B. We are asked
if there exists an extension to the votes in S with cost ≤ B such that p is the winner.
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Now, we show that the Evaluation under Top-truncated Uncertainty problem with
r = 0 (henceforth also referred to as the Evaluation problem) is equivalent to a special
case of the Weighted Extension-bribery problem namely, Weighted Extension-bribery with
zero costs (i.e. when δi = 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ n).
Theorem 14. For a given voting protocol, Weighted Extension-bribery with zero costs
is NP-hard if and only if the Evaluation under Top-truncated Uncertainty problem (with
r = 0) is NP-hard.
Next, before we look at the complexity of Weighted Extension-bribery with zero costs
(and hence of Evaluation) for all the voting rules considered in this paper, consider the
following version (CWCM’) of CWCM with top-truncated votes where the only difference
is that here we make it necessary for the non-manipulators to always have complete ballots
(i.e. in CWCM’ only the manipulators can caste top-truncated votes).
Definition 8 (CWCM’). CWCM’ with top-truncated votes is the same problem as
CWCM with top-truncated votes, with the additional restriction that the non-manipulators
always have complete preference orders.
The first thing to observe here is that all the NP-complete results for CWCM with
top-truncated votes from Section 3 hold for CWCM’ as well since a close look at the
proofs for Theorem 4, Theorem 6, Theorem 9, and Theorem 10 reveal that in all the
cases we showed reductions to instances which always had complete orders for the non-
manipulators. Hence, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 15. CWCM’ with top-truncated votes is NP-complete for 3-candidate X1↓ , 3-
candidate X2av, eliminate(X
3), 3-candidate plurality with runoff rule, and 3-candidate
Copelandα for α ∈ [0, 1), where X1 represents all scoring rules except plurality and veto,
X2 represents all scoring rules except plurality, and X3 represents all scoring rules except
veto.
The second observation to make regarding CWCM’ with top-truncated votes is that it
is a special case of Weighted Extension-bribery with zero costs, where some the ballots are
complete (those of the non-manipulators) and some are empty (those of the manipulators).
Therefore, any hardness result for CWCM’ carries over for Weighted Extension-bribery
with zero costs (and also for the Evaluation problem as a consequence of Theorem 14),
and so we have the following theorem.
Theorem 16. Weighted extension-bribery problem with zero costs (and hence even the
Evaluation problem) is NP-complete for 3-candidate X1↓ , 3-candidate X
2
av, eliminate(X
3),
3-candidate plurality with runoff, and 3-candidate Copelandα for α ∈ [0, 1), where X1
represents all scoring rules except plurality and veto, X2 represents all scoring rules except
plurality, and X3 represents all scoring rules except veto.
Additionally, we also have the following result which shows that Weighted Extension-
bribery with zero costs is in P for certain voting rules considered in this paper.
Theorem 17. Weighted Extension-bribery with zero costs (and hence even the Evaluation
problem) is in P for X↑, plurality↓, veto↓, pluralityav , and the maximin protocol, where X
is any positional scoring rule.
Next we show that if Evaluation is hard then constructive manipulation with even a
single manipulator is hard.
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Definition 9 (CWIM-TTU). In Constructive Weighted Individual Manipulation under
Top-truncated Uncertainty (CWIM-TTU), we are given a set S of partially-revealed top-
truncated ballots of the non-manipulators (which in turn may contain complete or top-
truncated ballots themselves), the weight of the manipulator, a preferred candidate p, and
a number r ∈ [0, 1]. We are asked if the manipulator can cast his vote in such a way so
as to ensure p wins with a probability greater than r.
Theorem 18. If Evaluation under Top-truncated Uncertainty is NP-hard for a given
protocol with k candidates, then CWIM-TTU with top-truncated votes is also NP-hard for
it with k candidates.
Proof. Construct an instance of CWIM-TTU from an Evaluation instance by just adding
a manipulator of weight 0. ⊓⊔
Combining Theorem 16 and Theorem 18, we have the following theorem which says
that for all the protocols considered in Section 3 for which CWCM with top-truncated
ballots was hard, even individual manipulation with top-truncated votes is hard when
there is uncertainty about the non-manipulators’ votes.
Theorem 19. CWIM-TTU with top-truncated votes is NP-complete for 3-candidate X1↓ ,
3-candidate X2av, eliminate(X
3), 3-candidate plurality with runoff rule, and 3-candidate
Copelandα for α ∈ [0, 1), where X1 represents all scoring rules except plurality and veto,
X2 represents all scoring rules except plurality, and X3 represents all scoring rules except
veto.
Finally, we conclude this section by showing that the CWIM-TTU with top-truncated
votes is in P for eliminate(veto) (it is easy to see that it is also in P for all the rules
mentioned in Theorem 17). We show this by first proving that Weighted Extension-bribery
with zero costs (and hence Evaluation) is in P for eliminate(veto).
Theorem 20. In the unique winner model, Weighted Extension-bribery with zero costs
(and Evaluation) is in P for eliminate(veto) when the number of candidates is bounded.
Theorem 21. In the unique winner model, CWIM-TTU with top-truncated votes (with
r = 0) is in P for eliminate(veto) when the number of candidates is bounded.
The above result also implies that, in the unique winner model, CWCM under Top-
truncated Uncertainty and with top-truncated votes (with r = 0) is in P for elimi-
nate(veto) when the number of candidates is bounded, since in eliminate(veto) any manip-
ulation that can be induced by an arbitrary set of the manipulators’ vote can be induced
if all the manipulators vote in the same way [3, Lemma 12].
5.2 When there is only probabilistic information on the non-manipulators’
votes
Manipulation under probabilistic uncertainty was introduced by Conitzer et al. [4]. In
their work they introduced the Weighted Evaluation problem which, given a probability
distribution on the votes, and a number r ∈ [0, 1], asks if the probability of a candidate
winning is greater than r. Subsequently they also proved that if CWCM (with complete
votes) for a voting protocol is hard then so is Weighted Evaluation [4, Theorem 15]. Now,
since we additionally allow top-truncated votes, we can state the following result which
is almost equivalent to [4, Theorem 15] with the only difference being that the “set of
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all possible votes” would now contain top-truncated votes as well and that the reduction
here is from CWCM with top-truncated votes. In fact, most of the results in this section
are only extensions to the corresponding result from Conitzer et al.’s paper [4] that arise
as a result of allowing top-truncated voting.
Theorem 22. If CWCM with top-truncated votes is NP-hard for a given protocol with
k candidates, then Weighted Evaluation when top-truncated votes are allowed is also NP-
hard for it (with k candidates) even if r = 0, the votes are drawn independently, and only
the following types of distributions are allowed: (1) the vote’s distribution is uniform over
all possible votes, or (2) the vote’s distribution puts all of the probability mass on a single
vote.
Proof. We can proceed exactly as in [4, Theorem 15] to prove this result. ⊓⊔
Corollary 6. Weighted Evaluation when top-truncated votes are allowed is NP-hard for
3-candidate X1↓ , 3-candidate X
2
av, eliminate(X
3), 3-candidate plurality with runoff, and
3-candidate Copelandα for α ∈ [0, 1), when the votes are drawn independently, and the
distributions allowed are: (1) uniform over all possible votes, or (2) the vote’s distribution
puts all of the probability mass on a single vote, where X1 represents all scoring rules ex-
cept plurality and veto, X2 represents all scoring rules except plurality, and X3 represents
all scoring rules except veto.
Next, we show a relation between the Weighted Evaluation and manipulation with a
single manipulator as in [4]. Note that the difference between CWIM with Uncertainty
(CWIM-U) that we define below and CWIM-TTU that we defined in the Section 5.1 is
in how the partial information about the non-manipulators’ votes are specified.
Definition 10 (CWIM-U). In Constructive Weighted Individual Manipulation under
Uncertainty (CWIM-U), given a distribution over all the non manipulators’ votes, the
weights of the non-manipulators, the weight of the manipulator, a preferred candidate p,
and a number r ∈ [0, 1], we are asked if the manipulator can cast his vote in such a way
so as to ensure p wins with a probability greater than r.
Theorem 23. If Weighted Evaluation with top-truncated votes is NP-hard for a protocol
with k candidates and some restrictions on the distribution, then CWIM-U with top-
truncated votes is also NP-hard for it with k candidates and the same restrictions on the
distribution.
Proof. Construct an instance of CWIM-U from an arbitrary Weighted Evaluation instance
by just adding a manipulator of weight 0. ⊓⊔
Finally, we show that Weighted Evaluation when top-truncated votes are allowed can
be hard even if CWCM with top-truncated votes is in P . For this we consider elimi-
nate(veto) for which CWCM with top-truncated votes was shown to be in P for bounded
number of candidates (see Corollary 1).
Theorem 24. In eliminate(veto), Weighted Evaluation when top-truncated votes are al-
lowed is NP-hard even if r = 0, the votes are drawn independently, and the distribution
over each vote has a positive probability for at most 2 of the votes.
12 Vijay Menon and Kate Larson
Voting Rule
CWCM DWCM
(#cand) (#cand)
X↑ P
P
Plurality↓ P
Veto↓ P
X1↓ NP-c (3)
Plurality
av
P
X2
av
NP-c (3)
eliminate(Veto) P P
eliminate(X3) NP-c NP-c (3)
Plurality with
runoff
NP-c (3) NP-c (3)
Copelandα,
α ∈ [0, 1)
NP-c (3) P
Maximin P P
X : All scoring rules X1 : All scoring rules except plurality and veto
X2 : All scoring rules except plurality X3 : All scoring rules except veto
Table 1. Complexity of CWCM and DWCM with Top-truncated Votes. The entries in bold indicate that
there is a change in complexity of CWCM as compared to the case of complete votes, the non-highlighted
ones indicate that there is no change to the worst-case complexity as compared to the case of complete
votes, and the italicized entries indicate those rules for which there is more opportunity for manipulation
but for which the worst-case complexity is still the same as compared to the case of complete votes.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
Much of the earlier work in computational social choice has made the assumption that the
voters specify complete preference orderings. However, there are many situations where
the agents may not be willing or may simply not be able to provide this information.
In this paper, we studied the problem of manipulation of weighted elections when the
agents are allowed to specify top-truncated preferences and also looked at the impact on
manipulation when there is uncertainty about the non-manipulators’ votes. We devoted
most of this article studying the first problem and in particular we provided general results
for constructive and destructive manipulation in all scoring rules, elimination versions of
all scoring rules, the plurality with runoff rule, a family of election systems known as
Copelandα, and the maximin protocol. These results are summarized in Table 1.
As was also noted by Narodytska and Walsh in their study of manipulation with
top-truncated votes for Borda, STV, and Copeland0.5 [14], there are three broad trends
that we can observe. First is the case where top-truncated voting has a strong impact
on manipulation and it in turn results in a decrease in the worst-case complexity of
manipulation as compared to the complete votes case. Examples of this are all the scoring
rules when using the round-up evaluation scheme and the maximin rule. Second is the
case where top-truncated voting has some impact on manipulation and in fact even causes
more strategic voting, but yet the worst-case complexity of manipulation remains the same
as compared to the complete votes case. Some examples of voting rules which fall into this
category are the Copelandα, X↓ for any scoring rule X that is not isomorphic to plurality
or veto etc. Lastly, we also see that there are voting rules for which top-truncated voting
has no impact whatsoever on strategic voting. For instance, top-truncated voting has no
impact on STV and eliminate(Veto).
The remainder of this article was devoted to exploring the second avenue i.e. when
there is uncertainty about the non-manipulators’ votes. Here we discussed two possible
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ways in which the uncertainty can be modeled and we also showed that in both cases,
under uncertainty, even individual manipulation was hard when constructive coalitional
manipulation was hard. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study the
impact on manipulation with top-truncated ballots when there is uncertainty about the
non-manipulators’ votes.
There are many possible avenues for future work. Foremost would be to look at other
forms of “partial votes” besides the top-truncated ones alone that we consider here. Al-
though Fitzsimmons and Hemaspaandra have started some work in this direction [9], they
only look at specific protocols. We feel that it would be interesting to look at how other
voting rules behave and also see if there is any scope to arrive at some general results.
Another interesting problem could be to look at restricted domains of preferences like
single-peaked preferences and see the impact of top-truncated voting on them. Finally,
despite proving hardness of manipulation for several voting protocols, a possible criticism
could be that the results are in the worst-case and that we use NP-hardness – which in
many cases does not necessarily reflect the actual difficulty in practice – as the complex-
ity measure. Therefore, another interesting research direction would be to look at the
average-case complexity of manipulation with top-truncated votes (or “partial” votes in
general), just like it has been done for the case of complete votes (for e.g. [10], [15], [16]).
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. It is easy to see that Fixed-Difference Subset Sum is in NP. To
prove NP-hardness, we show a reduction from an arbitrary instance of the Partition (P1)
problem. Let the arbitrary instance be {k1, · · · , kt} with
∑
i ki = 2K. Now, construct
the following instance {l1, · · · , lt, l
′
1, · · · , l
′
t} of Fixed-Difference Subset Sum(P2), where
li = ki + 2
n+i, l′i = 2
n+i, and n = ⌈log 2K⌉.
Suppose there exists a partition S1, S2 for P1. Then P2 has subsets T1, T2 such that∑
T1 −
∑
T2 = K +
∑t
i=1 2
i+n, where T1 = {li}i|ki∈S1 ∪ {l
′
i}i|ki∈S2 and T2 = ∅.
Conversely, suppose there exists subsets T1, T2 in P2 such that
∑
T1 −
∑
T2 = K +∑t
i=1 2
i+n. Now, it is easy to argue that none of li or l
′
i for i = 1, · · · , t can belong to T2,
because if so then the second term (
∑t
i=1 2
i+n) of
∑
T1 −
∑
T2 will not be attainable.
Therefore, we can construct S1 and S2 such that S1 = {ki}i|li∈T1 and S2 = {ki}i|li /∈T1 ,
and this in turn implies that P1 has a partition. ⊓⊔
Proof of Theorem 4. Since there are only three candidates, the scoring vector for the
corresponding positional scoring rule is defined by 〈α1, α2, α3〉, where α1 > α2 > α3 = 0
(because α1 = α2 is isomorphic to veto, α2 = α3 is isomorphic to plurality, and α3 can be
taken to be zero since translating the scores in a scoring rule does not affect the outcome
of the rule). Also, note that if the three candidates are p, a, and b, each manipulator votes
in one of the following ways3: (p), (p, a, b), (p, b, a), where for (p) candidate p gets a score
α2.
The problem is in NP since winner determination for any scoring rule can be done
in polynomial time. To show NP-hardness, we proceed by considering three cases: 1)
α1 >
3
2α2 2) α1 <
3
2α2 3) α1 =
3
2α2. For the first two cases, we reduce an arbitrary
instance of the Partition problem to an instance of CWCM, and for the third case we
show a reduction from the Fixed-Difference Subset Sum problem.
Case 1 (α1 >
3
2α2). Given a Partition instance {ki}1≤i≤t summing to 2K, construct the
following instance of CWCM, where p, a, and b are the three candidates. In S, let there
be a voter of weight (2α1 − α2)K voting for (a, b, p) and (b, a, p) each. As a result, a and
b have a score of (2α1 − α2)(α1 + α2)K each. In T , let each ki have a vote of weight
(α1 + α2)ki.
Suppose there exists a partition. Let those manipulators in one partition vote (p, a, b)
and those in the other vote (p, b, a). Then the score of p, a and b, is 2α1(α1 + α2)K, and
so p is a winner.
Conversely, suppose there exists a manipulation in favor of p. Let x, y, and z be the
sum of the ki’s of the manipulators in T who vote (p, a, b), (p, b, a), and (p), respectively.
So now, the score of p is ((x + y)α1 + zα2)(α1 + α2), while that of a and b is ((2α1 −
α2)K + xα2)(α1 +α2) and ((2α1 −α2)K + yα2)(α1 +α2), respectively. Since there exists
a successful manipulation, score of p should be at least as large as that of a, and so we
have ((x + y)α1 + zα2)(α1 + α2) ≥ ((2α1 − α2)K + xα2)(α1 + α2). Using the fact that
x+y+z = 2K, this simplifies to (K−x)α2 ≥ z(α1−α2) (1). Again, the score of p should
3 (p, a, b) ≡ (p, a), and (p, b, a) ≡ (p, b)
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be at least as large as that of b, so we have (K − y)α2 ≥ z(α1 − α2) (2). Adding (1) and
(2) and simplifying it, we have z(2α1 − 3α2) ≤ 0. Now, since we assumed α1 >
3
2α2, this
implies that z ≤ 0. But z cannot be less than 0, so it has to be equal to 0. Plugging z = 0
in (1) and (2), we have x ≤ K and y ≤ K respectively. This together with the fact that
x+ y + z = 2K implies that x = y = K, and therefore there exists a partition.
Case 2 (α1 <
3
2α2). Given a Partition instance, construct the following instance of
CWCM. In S, let there be a voter of weight 15K voting for (b, a, p), a voter of weight
5K voting for (b, p, a), a voter of weight 11K voting for (a, p, b), a voter of weight 9K
voting for (a, b, p), and a voter of weight 7K voting for (p, b, a) and (p, a, b) each. As a
result, the scores of a, b, and p are (20α1+22α2)K, (20α1+16α2)K, and (14α1+16α2)K
respectively. In T , let each ki have a vote of weight 6ki.
Suppose there exists a partition. Let those manipulators in one partition (who weight
to 6K) vote (p, b, a) and those in the other vote (p). Then the score of all the three
candidates is 20α1K + 22α2K, and so p is a winner.
Conversely, suppose there exists a manipulation in favor of p. Let x, y, and z be
the total weight of manipulators in T who vote (p, a, b), (p, b, a), and (p) respectively.
So now, the score of p is (x + y)α1 + zα2 + (14α1 + 16α2)K, while that of a and b
is (20α1 + 22α2)K + xα2 and (20α1 + 16α2)K + yα2 respectively. Since there exists a
successful manipulation, score of p should be at least as large as that of a, and so we
have (x + y)α1 + zα2 + 14α1K + 16α2K ≥ (20α1 + 22α2)K + xα2. Using the fact that
x+ y+ z = 12K, this simplifies to 6(α1 −α2)K − xα2 ≥ z(α1 −α2) (1). Again, the score
of p should be at least as large as that of b, so we have 6α1K − yα2 ≥ z(α1 − α2) (2).
Adding (1) and (2) and simplifying it, we have (6K − z)(2α1 − 3α2) ≥ 0. Now, since we
assumed α1 <
3
2α2, this implies that (6K − z) ≤ 0, or z ≥ 6K. Plugging z ≥ 6K in (1)
and (2), we have x ≤ 0, and y ≤ 6K, respectively. But then x cannot be less than 0, so it
has to be equal to 0, and this in turn results in z ≤ 6K in (1). But again, z cannot not
be both greater than and lesser than equal to 6K. So, z has to be equal to 6K, and since
x+ y + z = 12K, y = 6K. This implies there exists a partition.
Case 3 (α1 =
3
2α2). Consider the same instance of CWCM as in case 2. The scores of a,
b, and p are (20α1 + 22α2)K, (20α1 + 16α2)K, and (14α1 + 16α2)K respectively. In T ,
let each ki have a vote of weight 6ki.
Suppose there exists S1, S2 such that
∑
S1−
∑
S2 = K. Let those manipulators who
are in S1 vote (p, b, a), those in S2 vote (p, a, b), and let all the remaining manipulators vote
(p). If x, y, and z denote the sum of ki’s of the manipulators who vote for (p, a, b), (p, b, a),
and (p), respectively, then the scores of p, a, and b are 9(x + y)α2 + 6zα2 + 37α2K,
52α2K + 6xα2, and 46α2K + 6yα2, respectively. Now if there existed a manipulation,
then the score of p has to be at least as large as that of a and b. Let us consider p
and a first. Whatever follows can be replicated for b. Suppose s(p) ≥ s(a). This implies
9(x+ y)α2+6zα2+37α2K ≥ 52α2K+6xα2. Simplifying this we have, x+3y+2z ≥ 5K.
But since y − x = K and x + y + z = 2K, we know that x + 3y + 2z = 5K, and hence
our assumption that s(p) ≥ s(a) is true. Doing the same with respect to p and b, we
will see that s(p) = s(b). As a result, we can conclude that existence of S1, S2 such that∑
S1 −
∑
S2 = K results in a successful manipulation for p.
Conversely, suppose there exists a manipulation in favor of p. This implies that the
score of p is at least as much as that of a, and from above we know that this in turn
results in the inequality x+ 3y + 2z ≥ 5K. Using the fact that x+ y + z = 2K, we have
y − x ≥ K. Similarly, comparing p and b we have, y − x ≤ K. But then, y − x cannot be
both greater and lesser than equal to K at the same time. So y − x has to be equal to
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K, and this in turn implies that there exists two sets S1, S2 such that
∑
S1−
∑
S2 = K,
where y =
∑
S1 and x =
∑
S2. ⊓⊔
Proof of Theorem 6. Like in Theorem 4, since there are only three candidates, the
scoring vector for the corresponding positional scoring rule is defined by 〈α1, α2, α3〉, where
α1 ≥ α2 > α3 = 0. Also, note that if the three candidates are p, a, and b, each manipulator
votes in one of the following ways: (p), (p, a, b), (p, b, a), where for (p) candidate p gets a
score α1, a and b receive a score of (α2/2).
The proof uses a reduction from the Fixed-Difference Subset Sum problem and is very
similar to the one in case 3 Theorem 4. Given an instance of Partition, construct the
following instance of CWCM where in S we have a voter of weight (4α1+α2)K voting for
(b, a, p), a voter of weight (2α1 − α2)K voting for (a, b, p), and a voter of weight 2(α1 +
α2)K voting for (a, p, b). As a result, the scores of a, b, and p are (4α1 + α2)(α1 + α2)K,
(4α1 − α2)(α1 + α2)K, and 2α2(α1 + α2)K, respectively. In T, let each ki have a vote of
weight 2(α1 + α2)ki.
Suppose there exists S1, S2 such that
∑
S1−
∑
S2 = K. Let those manipulators who
are in S1 vote (p, b, a), those in S2 vote (p, a, b), and let all those remaining vote (p). If x, y,
and z denote the sum of the ki’s of the manipulators who vote for (p, a, b), (p, b, a), and
(p), respectively, then the scores of p, a, and b are (4α1+2α2)(α1+α2)K, ((4α1+α2)K+
2(xα2+zα2/2))(α1+α2), and ((4α1−α2)K+2(yα2+zα2/2))(α1+α2), respectively. Now
if there existed a manipulation, then the score of p has to be at least as large as that of
a and b. Let us consider p and a first. Whatever follows can be replicated for b. Suppose
s(p) ≥ s(a). This implies that (4α1+2α2)K ≥ (4α1+α2)K+2xα2+zα2. Simplifying this
we have, 2x+ z ≤ K. But since y−x = K and x+ y+ z = 2K, we know that 2x+ z = K,
and hence our assumption that s(p) ≥ s(a) is true. Doing the same with respect to p and
b, we will see that s(p) = s(b). As a result, we can conclude that existence of S1, S2 such
that
∑
S1 −
∑
S2 = K results in a successful manipulation for p.
Conversely, suppose there exists a manipulation in favor of p. This implies that the
score of p is at least as much as that of a, and from above we know that this in turn results
in the inequality 2x + z ≤ K (1). Similarly, comparing p and b we have, 2y + z ≤ 3K
(2). Now, using the fact that x + y + z = 2K, we know that inequality (1) reduces to
y − x ≥ K and inequality (2) reduces to y − x ≤ K. But then, y − x cannot be both
greater and lesser than equal to K at the same time. So y − x has to be equal to K, and
this in turn implies that there exists two sets S1, S2 such that
∑
S1 −
∑
S2 = K, where
y =
∑
S1 and x =
∑
S2. ⊓⊔
Proof of Theorem 7. Consider an arbitrary set W of top-truncated votes which –
along with the set S of non-manipulators’ votes – results in an elimination order e =
(c1, c2, · · · , cm = p), where p is the preferred candidate, and ci is the candidate eliminated
in the ith round. Now, consider the set of votes X such that each vote in W is replaced
by p = cm ≻ cm−1 ≻ · · · ≻ c1. X along with S results in the same elimination order e.
Therefore, we see that any manipulation that can be achieved by a set of top-truncated
votes can be achieved by casting an equivalent set of complete votes. ⊓⊔
Proof of Theorem 8. Assume there exists an arbitrary set W of top-truncated votes
which results in d receiving the lowest score. For each of the top-truncated votes inW , let
us complete them in the following way: If d is included in the vote, append all the other
candidates who are not part of it in any arbitrary order. If d is not there, place d at the
bottom of the preference ordering (as the mth preferred candidate) and the rest in any
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arbitrary order. Completing the votes as above does not change the candidate with the
lowest score. ⊓⊔
Proof of Theorem 10. It is easy to show that the problem is in NP. To show that it is
NP-hard, we use a reduction from an arbitrary instance of Fixed-Difference Subset Sum
problem. Let p, a, and b be the three candidates. In S, let there be a voter of weight 3K
voting for (a, b, p) and a voter of weight K voting for (b, a, p). In T , let each ki have a
vote of weight 2ki.
Suppose there exists S1, S2 such that
∑
S1 −
∑
S2 = K. In Copeland
α, it can be
assumed that all the manipulators rank p first. So, let the manipulators in S1 vote (p, b, a)
4,
those in S2 vote (p, a, b), and let the rest vote for (p). If NV (r, s) denotes the total number
of votes in V which rank r prior to s andDV (r, s) = NV (r, s)−NV (s, r), thenDS∪T (p, a) =
0 and DS∪T (p, b) = 0. Therefore, the score of p, s(p) = 2α. Also since
∑
S1−
∑
S2 = K,
DT (a, b) = −2K, while DS(a, b) = 2K. Therefore, DS∪T (a, b) = 0 and so, both receive a
score 2α. Since all of them have the same score, p is a winner.
Conversely, suppose there exists a successful manipulation in favor of p. If x, y, and
z, denote the sum of ki’s of the manipulators in T who vote (p, a, b), (p, b, a), and (p),
respectively, then without taking into account the pairwise election between a and b in
T , the score of p, a, and b is 2α, 1 + α, and α, respectively. Now since 2α < 1 + α
for all rational α ∈ [0, 1), therefore, the only way p would win this is if including the
pairwise election between a and b in T results in a tie between them. So this implies that
DS∪T (a, b) = 2K+2x−2y = 0 and that y−x = K. This in turn implies that there exists
sets S1 and S2 such that
∑
S1 −
∑
S2 = K, where y =
∑
S1 and x =
∑
S2. ⊓⊔
Proof of Theorem 11. Let W be an arbitrary set of top-truncated votes which – along
with the set S of non-manipulators’ votes – results in p being a winner. Since in the
maximin rule moving p to the top will never hurt p, we can safely assume that all the
votes in W have p at the top. Now for every vote in W , replace it by (p). By doing so we
see that p’s score does not change. Also note that for all the other candidates their scores
can only decrease or stay the same, but can never increase. Therefore, any constructive
manipulation achieved for p can be achieved if all manipulators just vote (p). ⊓⊔
Proof of Theorem 12. Consider a voting rule X that is monotone and is based on
numerical scores. Let the destructive manipulation be against the candidate h. Now,
suppose there exists an arbitrary set of top-truncated votes W that – along with the set
S of non-manipulators’ votes – results in the destructive manipulation of h in X. Since
X is based on scores we will have a final ordering of the candidates after the election.
Let e : c1(6= h) ≻ c2 ≻ · · · ≻ cm denote that ordering. Next, consider the set of votes W
′
which is formed by completing the votes in W in the following way: replace each vote in
W by placing c1 at the top, h at the bottom (i.e. at the mth position), and the rest of the
candidates in any arbitrary order. Since X is monotone, W ′ along with S cannot result
in the score of c1 decreasing and nor can it result in the score of h increasing. Therefore,
if W resulted in the destructive manipulation of h then so should W ′. ⊓⊔
Proof of Theorem 13. Since there are only three candidates, the scoring vector for the
corresponding positional scoring rule is defined by 〈α1, α2, α3〉, where α1 > α2 ≥ α3 = 0.
Showing that the problem is in NP is easy. To show NP-hardness, we use a reduction
4 In Copelandα with 3 candidates, (p, a, b) ≡ (p, a), and (p, b, a) ≡ (p, b)
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from an arbitrary instance of Anti-WCM〈S, T, h〉 with 3 candidates (see Corollary 2),
where a, b, and h are the three candidates, and h is the disliked candidate. In the DWCM
instance we construct, we use the same set of candidates, the same set of manipulators
T , and to the S from the Anti-WCM instance we add the following set S′ of voters such
that K is greater than the sum of the weights in S and T combined. In each case, we add
1 voter of the corresponding type and weight specified below.
K : (a, h, b)
2K : (h, a, b)
K : (b, h, a)
2K : (h, b, a)
3K : (a)
3K : (b)
We set h to be the disliked candidate in the DWCM instance.
Suppose there was a way to make h receive the lowest score in the Anti-WCM in-
stance. If scoreS(a) denotes the score candidate a receives from S, then this implies that
scoreS∪T (a) > scoreS∪T (h), and scoreS∪T (b) > scoreS∪T (h). Also, note that all the three
candidates a, b, and h are tied in S′ as each of them receive a score of 4α1K+2α2K. This
in turn implies that h receives the lowest score in the DWCM instance, and so will be elim-
inated in the first round. Thus, existence of a successful manipulation in the Anti-WCM
instance ensures the existence of a successful manipulation in the DWCM instance.
Conversely, suppose there exists a successful destructive manipulation against h in the
DWCM instance. We first show that this is possible only if h is eliminated in the first
round in eliminate(X). To do so, let us assume it were not the case and that one of a or
b was eliminated in the first round. Let us consider a first. If a was eliminated in the first
round then the votes in S′ would now be:
K : (h, b)
2K : (h, b)
K : (b, h)
2K : (h, b)
3K : (b)
Since the elimination of a means that they are only two candidates remaining, from
now on we can assume our protocol to be equivalent to plurality (since any scoring rule
is equivalent to plurality when there are only two candidates). So now, scoreS′(h) −
scoreS′(b) = K and since K is greater than sum of the weights in S and T combined this
implies that in the subsequent round b will be eliminated, thus resulting in h winning the
DWCM instance. Therefore, there cannot be a destructive manipulation against h in the
DWCM instance if a is eliminated in the first round. Similarly, by doing things identically
for candidate b, we can see that a destructive manipulation against h will not be possible
if b is eliminated in the first round. This in turn leads us to conclude that a successful
destructive manipulation against h is possible only if h is eliminated in the first round.
But then, since all the three candidates are tied in S′, the only way this can happen is if
h receives the lowest score in S. Or in other words, a successful destructive manipulation
against h in the DWCM instance is possible only if there exists a successful manipulation
against h in the Anti-WCM instance. ⊓⊔
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Proof of Theorem 14. Consider an arbitrary instance of the Weighted Extension-
bribery with S, and p, and the same instance for the Evaluation problem. Now, it is clear
that if there exists an extension in Weighted Extension-bribery problem, then p wins
with probability greater than zero in the Evaluation problem. Conversely, if p wins the
non-zero probability in the Evaluation problem then this implies that there is at least on
extension where it wins. ⊓⊔
Proof of Theorem 17. For all the above mentioned protocols except plurality↓, the
best we can do is to extend each top-truncated vote by placing p at its end (i.e. place p as
kth candidate if k − 1 candidates are already ranked), if it isn’t already present. In case
of plurality↓, the best strategy is to complete each of the top-truncated votes by placing
p at the topmost position possible followed by all the other as-yet unranked candidates
in any arbitrary order. ⊓⊔
Proof of Theorem 20. Suppose there was an arbitrary extension W which resulted in
p winning. Let the corresponding elimination order be e = (c1, c2, · · · , cm = p), where ci
is the candidate eliminated in the ith round. Now, we claim that the same elimination
order can be achieved by doing the following:
– In each of the of the top-truncated vote, complete it by placing the candidates in
the reverse order in which they appear in e. That is, place p if not already present,
followed by cm−1 if not present, and so on until c1.
Doing the above results in the same elimination order as e. This can be shown through
an inductive argument. When there are m candidates, c1 which is eliminated first in e
has been placed last wherever possible and this in turn will result it in getting eliminated
first in our completion. Once c1 is eliminated, we have m − 1 candidates with c2 placed
last wherever possible and therefore c2 will be eliminated next. Continuing this way,
guarantees the elimination order e.
To solve Weighted Extension-bribery, the campaign manager can try out all possible
elimination orders, extend the votes as outlined above, and see if any of them results in
p winning. Doing so will only take polynomial time since the number of candidates are
bounded. ⊓⊔
Proof of Theorem 21. Since the Evaluation problem is in P , the manipulator can
try out all possible complete orders to check if manipulation is possible. This is enough
because, for eliminate(veto), any manipulation that can be achieved by top-truncated
votes can be achieved by completing the vote appropriately (see Theorem 7). ⊓⊔
Proof of Theorem 24. We show this by a reduction from an arbitrary instance of the
Partition problem to the following instance of Weighted Evaluation. Let a, b, and p be
three candidates. Let there be a vote of weight 1 for (p, a, b). For each ki in the partition
instance, let it have a weight ki and vote for (a, p, b) and (b, p, a) with probability 1/2
each.
Now, we can see that p wins if and only if (a, p, b) and (b, p, a) are voted by exactly K
of the vote weight, because failing to do so would mean that p will be eliminated in the
second round. But then this is possible if and only if there exists a partition. ⊓⊔
